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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
WHERE THE JURY HANGS FIVE TO THREE ON A VERY MATERIAL ISSUE 
A NEW TRIAL SHOULD BE GRANTED. 
POINT II 
WHERE THE INSURED PAID THE PREMIUM; WAS TOLD THAT HE WAS 
FULLY INSURED; AND THE COMPANY HAD THE RIGHT TO TERMINATE 
THE AGREEMENT IN THIRTY DAYS IF IT CONCLUDES THE APPLICANT 
IS NOT ACCEPTABLE; AHD THE COMPANY FAILS TO ACCEPT OR REJECT 
THE APPLICANT UNTIL EIGHT MONTHS AFTER THE LOSS OCCURRED; 
THE COMPANY MAY NOT THEN VOID THE POLICY BY CLAIMING A PRE-
EXISTING PHYSICAL CONDITION (HIGH BLOOD PRESSURE). 
POINT III 
WHERE THERE IS ADMITTEDLY NO FRAUD AND THE INSURED IS LED 
TO BELIEVE THAT HE IS INSURED, THE COMPANY CANNOT DENY 
COVERAGE AFTER THE LOSS rs. INCURRED. 
POINT IV 
GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION AND STREATOR CHEVROLET 
ARE EQUALLY RESPONSIBLE BY REASON OF THE CONDITIONAL SALES 
CONTRACT AND THE CERTIFICATE OF INSURANCE. 
POINT V 
THE GENERAL AGENT, REX ELTON, WAS REQUIRED TO INQUIRE AS TO 
THE APPLICANT'S HEALTH AND TO ADVISE HIM OF THE VOIDABLE 
CLAUSES IN THE POLICY. 
POINT VI 
THE GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION IS NOT ENTITLED 
TO ANY ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
-la-
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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action to replevy a new Chevrolet 
automobile purchased under a Conditional Sales Contract. 
The contract provided for disability and life insurance. 
The Buyers cross-complained ag~inst the insurance company 
by reason of a total disability (kidney failure). The 
Insurance Company refused payment on the grounds of a uni-
lateral clause alleging a pre-existing condition. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was submitted to a Jury in the form of 
a Special Verdict.. The Jury hung on the material Interro-
gatory five to three in the car buyer's (defendant~s) 
favor. The trial Judge, Dean E. Conder, denied defendants' 
motion for Judgment on the Verdict and/or defendants' motion 
for a new trial. The trial Court further granted a directed 
Verdict in favor of General Motors Acceptance Corporation 
and Streator Chevrolet Company, Incorporated on the Condi-
tional Sales Contract. From the denial of these motions 
the defendants, Hector Martinez and Manuel M. Rivera, file 
this appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek a Judgment against the Great Equity 
Life Insurance Company in the amount of the balance due on 
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the Conditional Sales Contract or an order granting a New 
Trial by reason of the hung Jury Verdict. 
MATERI~L FACTS OF THE CASE 
On the 12th of September, 1978, Hector Martinez, 
age 19, purchased a Chevrolet automobile from Streator Chev-
rolet Compa~y, Incorporated. By reason of the Conditional 
Sales Contract, Hector Martinez also purchased a life in-
surance policy and paid a premium therefore in the amount 
of $97.40; said contract also acknowledged and provided for 
the purchase of disability, accident and health insurance 
and paid a premium therefore i-n the amount of $189.81. The 
Conditional Sales Contract did provide that should Hector 
Martinez die or become totally disabled that· the Great Equity 
Life Insurance Company of Chicago, Illinois would pay off 
the contract in i~s entirety, to wit: the sum of $5,995.00. 
The Conditional Sales Contract is annexed hereto as Exhibit 
"A" and by reference made a part of this brief. The Condi-
tional Sales Contract was assigned by Streator Chevrolet 
Company, Incorporated, forthwith and immediately to General 
Motors Acceptance Corporation. Payments were faithfully made 
by H.ector Martinez as provided by the Conditional Sales Con--
tract up to and including November 19, 1978. On this 
day, Hector Martinez entered the University of Utah Hospi-
tal with lung congestion and on this date the doctors at 
-2-
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the hospital diagnosed a complete kidney failure and deter-
mined that Hector Martinez, as a result thereof, was com-
pletely disabled; claims under the policy were promptly filed. 
On or about July 12, 1979, General Motors Accep-
tance Corporation, filed a complaint herein seeking to re-
plevy a Chevrolet automobile from Hector Martinez alleging 
that Hector Martinez was eight months delinquent in payments 
under the contract. Hector Martinez, who had been complete-
ly disabled for the eight month period, to wit: from Novem-
ber 19, 1978 to July 12, 1979, cross-complained against the 
Great Equity Life Insurance Company and Streator Chevrolet 
Company, Incorporated, and counterclaimed against General 
Motors Acceptance Corporation, a New York corporation, alleg-
ing that he was entitled to the benefits of the disability 
insurance as provided in the Contract, he having become dis-
abled, the contract was to be completely paid by the Great 
Equity Life Insurance Company. The Great Equity Life Insur-
ance Company admitted that there was insurance contracted 
and paid for, commencing September 12, 1978, but alleged 
that they were entitled to retroactively void the insurance 
coverage after the loss was incurred by reason of a uni-
1 a teral clause pertaining to pre-existing conditions. 
-3-
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Hector Martinez relied on the coverage as was 
set out in the Conditional Sales Contract, which is as 
follows: 
.. "',t.J .. 
,. .. 
?SUjer (and C;Buyer)-Name. and Address (lncl.ude-County a~d Zip Code) 
Address 
Seller-Name and Address 
\-...!.. \'- . ~ :. . ,.._ ~. ~·~ ' ·. \ . . \. \ S~ CmtVltOLET COMP.AB! 
HJ.DI at Sth SODTB 
! ... _ 
"I SAI.T I.An CITY9 UllB 84lll , ... ... :". ~ 
The seller hereby sells, and the buyer (meaning all undersigned buyers, jointly and severally) hereby purchases, subject to the terms set forth below and upon the reverse side h 
the following property, delivery and acceptance of which in good order are hereby acknowledged by buyer, viz.: 
New or Used Year Model No. Cyl. Make Trade Name Body Type - If Truck,. Give GVW Model No. or Serles Vehicle Identification No. 
·,· 
I I 
' \ .. .. ~ J \ ·. ·. \ t' ~ 
' 
\ 
If truck-Describe bodies and, major items of equipment sold-
Buyer represents that th~ purchase of said property is primarily for personal, family or house hold ~, agricultural 0, business (other than agricultural) O use (check one). 
1. CASH PRICE (including any accessories~e/.rv.~CE!J_,!~d1 t~xes imposed on the cash sale) .-:;:-•• \ ............................................. $ 4500.00 (1) 2. TOTALDOWNPAYMENT-Trade-in 1~·•;1'1.1 . .A $ ·n-tl- $ ?ts«• $ n.a, plus$ lOOQ.00 $ lQM 0 QQ al 
!. I Make, Model, Yeir Gross Trade-in :. (Payoff· made by Trade-in (Met) Cuh Downpayment 
Allowanca seller) 
3. UNPAID BALANCE OF CASH PRICE (Difference between Items 1and2) ................................................................ $ lSIJ0.00 {3) 
4. OTHER CHARGES 
*A. Cost of Required Physical Damage Insurance ................................................................................ ; ...... $--~:~a .... ,__!4~ 
**8. Cost of Optional Mechanical Breakdown Insurance ........................................................ , ........................... $ :.a. !4! 
BUYER MAY CHOOSE THE PERSON THROUGH WHICH THE INSURANCE IN A AND B IS TO BE OBTAINED. 
C. Cost of Creditor Insurance I or the term hereof. 
COVERAGE OF THE BUYER BY ANY SUCH INSURANCE IS NOT REQUIRED BY SELLER. 
CHECK CIEDITOI *** !'.] Life ........••......••.•.......•••....•.•..•...•••••.•.....................•..... $ 
INSURANCE DESIRED t!J Disability (Accident and Health) ..•...••...•.......•...•..•.•..................... $ 
701 TP..! TE!M t!EIE01' O Other (describe) ................... :............................................ $ 
BUYER'S APPROVAL: I olstRE. TO OBTAIN THE CREDITOR INSURANCE CHECKED ABOVE FOR THE BUYER PROPOSED FOR INSURANCE. 
9/1?/78 
(Date) 
97.,0 (4C 
1S9.Sl 14c 
n. a 1 !4C 
D. Official Fees (Describe) ••••••••••.•.••••••.•.. SAlJ!S . .:?AX......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 215 0 00 14t 
E. License and/or Registration Fees (Itemize) ...•...•.....•.•...•.•.•••••••••••••••••••••••••.••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••..•.•.• $ S 
0
50 14f 
F. Certificate,.of Title Fee •.•••••••••.••••••••••••.••..••••...•••••• -: .............................................................. $ __ .n:a.--14f 
G. Other (De~ribe) •...•••••••••••••.••••••••.• ooc •.. ?.U. .................................................................. '._. $ 1.so 14G 
5. UNPAID BALA. CE-AMOUNT FINANCED (Sum of items 3 and 4) ...................................................................... ~"$ ~023 
1 
471 (~ 
6. Fl:~ANCE C~ARGE ............. · .... ~ ........................................•••....•••......••.............•................... $ 9£6.79--'.~ 
7. TOTAL OF PAYMENTS (Sum of items.5 and 6) ...................................... , ................................................. $.· 499S.C'l -·tn 
8. DEPERRED PAYMENT PRICE (Sum of items l, 4 and 6) ................................................................................ $ 5995.00 _:8) 
9. ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATE ...................................................................... ·......................... 14 5S.%(~l 
10. PAYMENT SCHEDULE: The Total of Payments (Item 7) is payable at seller's office designated below or at such office of any assignee as may be hereafter designated in..JA.. 
!nstalments of $ l 16 • 75 each, commencing 1.Qf 12== · 192!\_ and on the same day of each successive month thereafter or as indicat~ 
in space below. . . • • · • 
'. -'t, . .-\. \1" 
' ', 1 ' 
-4-
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The certificate of insurance named General Motors Acceptance 
Corporation, a New ~ork corporation, as the ~reditor­
beneficiary and provided that should Hector Martinez, age 19, 
die or become disabled during the term of the Conditional 
Sales ·Contract that the Great Equity Life Insurance Company 
would pay the Conditional Sales Contract of and in its entire-
ty. The Certificate further provided that the term of insur-
ance would commence as of September 12, 1978 and would expire 
on the maturity date of the indebtedness subject to acceptance 
by the insurer and within thirty days there would be deli-
vered to Hector Martinez a certificate of insurance more fully 
describing the insurance. No policy of insurance was ever 
delivered. No notice of acceptance or rejection of Hector 
Martinez as an insured was given within the thirty days. No 
premium was ever returned to Hector Martinez. (Tr.-163) (Tr.-170) 
Eight months after Hector Martinez was disabled 
by kidney failure, to wit: On July 12, 1979, the Great Equity 
Life Insurance Company denied coverage under the insurance 
certificate claiming that Hector Martinez has a pre-existing 
condition, to wit: High blood pressure, which permitted 
them to retroactively void the policy after the loss had been 
incurred. 
Dr. Duffy testified that high blood pressure was 
non-symptomatic (a silent killer) and that Hector Martinez 
would not be aware of the ensuing kidney failure (Tr.-43). 
-5-
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In this regard, the Court submitted to the Jury a special 
Interrogatory and the Jury by a five to three vote found 
that Hector Martinez did not know nor should he have known 
of the pre-existing physical condition exclusion referred 
to in the insurance policy. Other Interrogatories were pre-
sented to the Jury to which there was no dispute, to wit: 
Did the Disability policy have a pre-
existing condition exclusion ... ? 
This was undisputed. 
Did Hector Martinez have an injury or 
illness for which medical diagnosis or 
treatment was required? 
This was undisputed. 
Did the injury or sickness of Mr. Martinez 
cause a loss within six months after 
the effective date of the disability 
policy? 
This was undisputed. 
Did Hector Martinez become totally dis-
abled? 
This was not only undisputed but was part of the proof re-
quired by Hector Martinez to recover in the case. The key 
question was answered by a majority in Hector Martinez's 
favor. 
It is undisputed that all insurance premiums were 
paid in full (Tr.-20); that the insurance company had thirty 
(30) days to accept or reject Hector Martinez as an insured 
(See D-25); that coverage was denied eight months after the 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
loss occurred without a return of any premium whatsoever. (Tr. -163.) 
On July 12, 1979 Hector Martinez was denied cover-
age under the insurance certificate on the basis that he had 
a pre-existing condition and that there was a clause in the 
policy that if Hector Martinez had a pre-existing condition 
that the insurance company could void the policy. 
On November 19, 1978, Hector Martinez was admitted 
to the University of Utah Hospital with lung congestion 
at which time he suffered a complete kidney failure and 
became fully and completely disabled. 
The Jury by a five to three vote found that Hector 
Martinez did not know nor should he have known of the pre-
existing physical condition exclusion referred to in the 
insurance policy. Irrespective of this, Judge Dean E. 
Conder_entered Judgment of No Cause of Action in favor of 
the insurance company and against Hector Martinez. 
The general agent, Rex Elton, testified that he 
made no inquiries regarding the health of Hector Martinez 
(Tr~l61, Tr.-156). He further testified that there was no 
fraud or deception of any type or nature by the insured 
(Tr.~155) and that he had no memory of any delivery of a 
certificate of insurance to Hector Martinez (Tr ..... 156) (-See 
also Tr. -169) . 
When the insurance company denied coverage, General 
Motors Acceptance Corporation filed an action in replevin 
-7-
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in which they sought to immediately recover possession of 
the 1977 Chevrolet automobile. The finance company also 
sued for a deficiency judgment and extensive attorney's 
fees. The defendants, by third-party complaint made the 
Great Equity Life Insurance Company a third-party defen-
dant and counterclaimed against General Motors Acceptance 
Corporation on the grounds that the finance company was a 
direct assignee of Streator Chevrolet and on the further 
ground that the finance company was the beneficiary under 
the insurance policy and as such had accepted payments and 
premiums and by reason of the assignments, the documents, 
the insurance policy, that the finance company was equally 
liable. Judge Conder directed a verdict in favor of General 
Motors Acceptanc~ Corporation, and from this order the 
defendants appeal. 
It is undisputed that the Great Equity Life Insur-
ance Company accepted a good and sufficient premium; that 
they led Hector Martinez to honestly believe that he was 
fully and completely covered; that they failed to make the 
insurance certificate available to Hector Martinez or to 
inform him of the contents and that he was unaware of any 
clause·by which the insurance company ~ould unilaterally 
declare the policy void until after the loss had been 
incurred. By not informing Hector Martinez of their accep-
tance or rejection as an insured within thirty (30) days 
-8-
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as provided in the certificate, and the contract having been 
completed in good faith, the insurance was in full force 
and effect when the loss occurred. The Great Equity Life 
Insurance Company having plead an exception or exclusion 
as a defense, they had the burden of persuasion and the 
burden of proof to sustain their position. The Jury by a 
five to three vote found that they did not sustain their 
burden of proof and the Court should have granted a mistrial 
in favor of Hector Martinez. 
Rex Elton failed and refused to ask Hector Mar-
tinez any questions whatesoever concerning his health even 
though there was a Buyer's Age Statement and Health Declara-. 
tion as set forth in the Conditional Sales Contract: 
IUYEl~·s· ACE STlT'EMEMT AHO HOl TH D£CURAT10H (.&~labia When 1 Cb3r11 Hu Sea Arathcrind ta ~c Um md 
las:n::a Uadct Pr.t~!IJI Groa11 Hr, GL·3SO :.S ~zad). 
Ap !:st !1ir1h~y c! gGy!t PT!l(:csed fer Ul1 li:..~r:ir.al [j Ua:J.:r 6S 
I, tbe e11yu P~~ for Ufl lc:r=a, aadmtmd 1h2t !ht im:~n~ is ccrly 1'1111atM lo a lmyer wh= mJU11h1 I01"ia..flnt da:f.,.tio_ns 
ta lad11:a Prudent!~ ta c:!t:1 m:lt ln~r..::i: I d12 hm!ly t!etian t!:Jf '111thir. th: µ:1 rtm r.tc::iths (1) Ihm nal c:nsi:!tz~ or bten anucr 
Ula C21 at a t!a:tar ar atl!tr llS'Xtilia:iu fat c.:r.::r, 211d (Z) I hm act ~eu ci:n~ned le 1 n~!lf f1f at~:r intit:itl.>11 ~ase al lay 
cnditfaa of the hclrt, !:ni•, lher. klt!:icys or ''DfS. I hen!Jy utllwrus my 'h~~ er ha::;i!al ta '1:!:s1 l• Pr:t!::iti4! ~ lala::utloa 
mannii111 my media history '11ar to th• d111 af this murzt. 
s1c11111n 
~~------........ ....,.---:--=-~-----:-:"~~~~~----~-(Si1111lur• ol Buyer Prooosed tor Ufe lnsuranct) 
In addition thereto, there evidently was issued 
a life insurance and disability insurance certificate which 
Rex Elton had no·memory of ever delivering to Hector Mar-
tinez and in addition thereto he had no recollection of ever 
mailing same to Hector Martinez. (Tr . ..,..150) (Tr.--157) 
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Tht Signerb} of the contract hereby take(s) notic1 that grol.lp credit life insuranca coverage and/or group credit accident ar.d haa! th insuran:a covera~e wi 
bt applicable to this can tract if '10 mark ad an tha front of the contract and each such type of covu:tge wiil be written by tha insur:inca company !13mt 
above. This insurance, subject to acceptance by the insurer covers only the personfal signing the request for such insurance. The amount of charg:i is indic~t1 
for each typa of credit insurance to bt purchased. The term of insurance will commence as of the data the indebtedness is incurred and will expira or! tn 
date 15 days after the original scheduled maturity data of the indebtedness. Subiect to acceptance by the insurer and within 30 days tnera wj!l !le ..ia•iwe 
ta the insured debtor a certificate of insurance more fully describing the insurance. in the event of prepayment cf tne indebtedness, a refund of inn:t3n: 
I
. charges will bt made when due. 
Applicznt 
Ca-Signer 
Witness _____________ Cate ___________ _ 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
WHERE THE JURY HANGS FIVE TO THREE ON A VERY MATERIAL ISSUE 
A NEW TRIAL SHOULD BE GRANTED. 
POINT II .. 
WHERE THE INSURED PAID THE PREMIUM; WAS TOLD THAT HE WAS 
FULLY INSURED; AND TtlE COMPANY HAD THE RIGHT TO TERMINATE 
THE AGREEMENT IN THIRTY DAYS IF IT CONCLUDES THE APPLICANT 
IS NOT ACCEPTABLE; AND THE COMPANY FAILS TO ACCEPT OR REJECT 
THE APPLICANT UNTIL EIGHT MONTHS AFTER THE LOSS OCCURRED; 
THE COMPANY MAY NOT THEN VOID THE POLICY BY CLAIMING A PRE-
EXISTING PHYSICAL CONDITION (HIGH BLOOD PRESSURE). 
POINT III 
WHERE THERE IS ADMITTEDLY NO FRAUD AND THE INSURED IS LED 
TO BELIEVE THAT HE IS INSURED, THE COMPANY CANNOT DENY 
COVERAGE AFTER THE LOSS IS INCURRED. 
-10-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT IV 
GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION AND STREATOR 
CHEVROLET ARE EQUALLY RESPONSIBLE BY REASON OF THE CONDI-
TIONAL SALES CONTRACT AND THE CERTIFICATE OF INSURANCE. 
POINT V 
THE GENERAL AGENT, REX ELTON, WAS REQUIRED TO INQUIRE AS 
TO THE APPLICANT'S HEALTH AND TO ADVISE HIM OF THE VOIDABLE 
CLAUSES IN THE POLICY. 
POINT VI 
THE GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION IS NOT ENTITLED 
TO ANY ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
~-11~ 
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POINT I 
WHERE THE JURY HANGS FIVE TO THREE ON A VERY MATERIAL ISSUE 
A NEW TRIAL SHOULD BE GRANTED. 
The Jury found by a 5 to 3 vote in favor of Hector 
Martinez and against the Great Equity Life Insurance Com-
pany (the insurance company failed to sustain their burden 
of proof) in the following particulars: 
Interrogatory No. 2: Did Hector Martinez 
know or should he have known of the pre-existing physical 
condition exclusion referred to in question 1. 
Yes 3 
No 5 
Great Equity's principal witness was Rex Elton, 
car salesman, insurance agent and employee of Streator 
Chevrolet Company (Tr.~146), who testified as follows: 
Q: Do you recall dealing with Hector 
Martinez, the gentleman behind me--
A: No, sir. (Tr.-150) 
Q: If I understand you right you have no 
memory of waiting on Hector Martinez 
at all. 
A: That's correct. 
Q: No memory of him being in your office? 
A: No, sir. 
Q: And if I understand you further the 
best of your recollection, no questions 
regarding health of any type or nature 
were asked of Hector Martinez? 
-12-
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A: That~s correct. 
Q: You did evidently handle the execution 
of Plaintiff's Exhibit 1? 
A: Yes, sir. (Tr.-157) 
Q: Did you have Hector Martinez sign any type 
of an application for insurance with Great 
Equity Insurance Company? 
A: Only thing they signed is on the Condi~ 
tional Sales Contract. (Tr.-157) 
Q: You don't know whether or not a policy of 
insurance was mailed to him or not do you? 
A: I can only tell you what is normally done. 
(Tr.-158) 
Q: You never asked Hector Martinez if he had 
(a pre-existing condition)? 
A: No, sir. (Tr.-161) 
Q: He looked healthr to you, didn't he? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: You were happy to insure h~m·and take his 
money? Isn't that true? 
A: Yes, sir. (Tr.-161) 
Q: Well, as an agent, didn't you receive a 
commission for 
Mr. Hansen: Raise the same objection. 
Mr. Miner: I think it's admissible, your 
Honor. Goes to his credibility, and 
bias and prejudice. 
The Court: I don't think so. Sustained. 
Mr. Miner: It was to your advantage to sell 
this particular policy to Hector Martinez 
monetarily? 
-13-
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Mr. Hansen: Same form of question really. 
The Court: Sustained. (Tr.-159) 
Q: Do you know whether or not there was ever 
any refund of any premium to Hector Martinez, 
of your own knowledge? 
A: No, sir. 
The Jury found in favor of Hector Martinez and 
against the Great Equity Life Insurance Company that the 
policy·of insurance was never delivered to Hector Martinez, 
and therefore he did not know and could not know of the 
pre-existing condition exclusion existing in the policy. 
The legal effect of the Jury's findings are: 
(a) That where the insured has no knowledge 
of a condition which would render a policy voidable, and 
(b) Where the general agent, who has complete 
knowledge of the voidable condition fails to advise the 
applicant of the condition, and 
(c) In addition thereto, where the general 
agent fails and refuses to ask any questions concerning the 
applicant's health, and 
(d) Where the agent failed and refused to 
fill out or ask any of the questions set forth on the Con-
ditional Sales Contract, and 
(e) Where the agent testified that there 
were no false representations of any type or nature on the 
part of Hector Martinez, and 
-14-
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(f) Where the general agent issues a policy 
in good faith and specifically agrees that there was no in-
tent to deceive or to misrepresent any facts on the part of 
the insured, the Great Equity Life Insurance Company under 
the law, will not be permitted to avoid coverage under the 
·policy. (See Wootton vs. Combined Insurance Company of Amer-
ica, 16 Utah 2d 52, 54-55, 395 P.2d 724 (1964). 
POINT II 
WHERE THE INSURED PAID THE PREMIUM; WAS TOLD THAT HE WAS 
FULLY INSURED; AND THE COMPANY HAD THE RIGHT TO TERMINATE 
THE AGREEMEi{T IN THIRTY DAYS IF IT CONCLUDES THE APPLICANT 
IS NOT ACCEPTABLE; AND THE COMPANY FAILS TO ACCEPT OR REJECT 
THE APPLICANT UNTIL EIGHT MONTHS AFTER THE LOSS OCCURRED; 
THE COMPANY MAY NOT THEN VOID THE POLICY BY CLAIMING A PRE-
EXISTING PHYSICIAL CONDITION (HIGH BLOOD PRESSURE). 
The Great Equity Life Insurance Company intended 
to execute the insurance policy affording Hector Martinez 
the coverage purchased; and, the policy issued contained a 
condition rendering it voidable from its inception. This 
was known to the general agent and the insurance company. 
Under Utah law it is presumed that the Great Equity Life 
Insurance Company intended to issue a valid policy. It is 
further presumed that the insurance company was informed 
-15-
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of all facts concerning the coverage requested and purchased. 
Under these facts the policy must be enforced as a valid 
policy. The law clearly states that where the insurance 
company by their actions and conduct induced the insured 
(Hector Martinez) to act to his detriment, then and in that 
event, the law denies the insurance company the legal effect 
to a provision of the policy inserted for the benefit or 
protection of the insurer. (See, Manufacturer & Merchants 
Indemnity Company vs. Claman, 96 F. Supp. 385 (D. Iowa 1951); 
Hully vs. Aluminum Company of America, 143 F. Supp. 508 
(D. Iowa 1956); Standard Accident Insurance Company vs. 
Roberts, 130 F. 2d 794 (8th Cir. Ark. 1942); Fidelity National 
Bank vs. Central Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company 
48 So. 2d 668 (La Appellate 1950); Stokes vs. American Cent. 
Insurance Company, 211 Miss. 584, 52 So. 2d 358 (1951). 
There was an agreement on the part of Rex Elton, 
the general agent of the Great Equity Life Insurance Company, 
to issue an insurance policy on the life of Hector Martinez 
and to provide disability insurance, health and accident, 
for Hector Martinez as set forth below: 
I 
COVERAGE OF c:~:KB~::D~:a: ANY SUCH '~:~R;c~i~! .~~~. ~.[.~~~~~.~.;~~ .~~~~~~: ................................................. $·-.-:9::i..7s.-. ...... t.~o,._(4Cl .\ 
INSURANCE DESIRED t!J Disability (Accident and Health) .................................................. $ l S9.Sl (4Cl 
YOlt TRE TERM nmu:or D other (describe)................................................................ $ n.". (4Cl 
BUYER'S APPROVAL: I otslRE TO OBTAIN THE. CREDITOR INSURANCE CHECKED. ABOVE FOR THE BUYER PROPOSED FOR INSURANCE. 
•. .. . . l ·--
• Slraatare /, · J · ~;i., , -,-/·-,·1 , / ·r.-· · " --~ .,, .. tj./]?/78 ~/ '..._~•V<./vt/Y 1!n\.V l.'<>l-'J ~-------------r) 
(Date) (Buyer's Sl1n1ture) ~ .• J- -::..~ :-·; ... (Co· Buyer's Si&nature) 
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Rex Elton failed and refused to ask Hector Mar-
tinez any questions whatsoever, concerning his health even-
though there was a Buyer's Age Statement and Health Decla-
ration as s~t forth in the Conditional Sales Contract: 
IUYER"S ACE ST.lT£MEHT AHO HE.ll TH DECUR.lTIOH (Ai;llntltt Wl'len a C:t3flt Hu Beo Aatbmim fl 4C .lbm 1U 
lmnm Uader PruClfttla GroaJ Palley GL·llO Is Pnl!lmd). 
A1112Sl binb~y a( B::yu Prn!:as&d far Utt ln.•1:rla'l'Cll O Ua:er 6S 
I, ti'.& 811ytr P~d for U?! l:::r::t. oadmt~d th:t th1 l=r.ncs Is cey mil~tie 11 a lnmr ""a cui!s !ht loftiiWinf dacbntlans 
It lldaca Pru~tlJI l; el!=t mcll lns:ru:i: I da hmby d!Ci.n t:UI ltilhin th1 ;asr r~r:: r.cntt:s (l) Ihm nat =ns:.1rn ar b!tn ondct 
Ult C2'1 gt a da::tcr ar a!h!r ~tilia:u far uuu, 111d (l) I hn' a:Jt heta confined le i l'I~!~ at olh:t hsstiflltl.» !:!aim ol 1ny 
c:udi!!:J~ of the he:rt. !:nia, !her, lldneys cr IHft. I llereby 211tll.wi my Jhr:;W: ::r ha:;:it.i la ~.don It Prldr.t~ ~ l:l~m~ti= 
cnurni:-i my mcdicll history piicr to Iha dJtc of lllfs cautrxL 
Slt•1tv1 
og-~---------.------..--~---,..,~~---------------(Sic111lutt al 811ywr Prooosad lot UI• •nsunna) 
In addition thereto, there evidently was issued 
a life insurance and disability insurance certificate which 
Rex Elton had no memory of ever delivering to Hector Mar-
tinez and in addition .thereto, he.had no recollection of 
ever mailing same to Hector Martinez. (In fact he had no 
memory of the transaction at all). 
Tht Sign1r(s) of tht contract hereby take(s) notice that group credit life insurance cavera91 and/or group credit accident and health insuranc1 c12ven;1 w:li 
bt 1pplicabl1 to this contract if-sa marked an the front of tht contract and each such t'VP• of coverage will bt written bv tht insuranca cam:any name: 
tbave. This insurance, subject ta acteptanca by tha insurer coven onlv tha person(sl signing the request far suth _1Murancs. Tha amount or cnargs is indi:3~1: 
far ttcn type af credit insuranc1 ta be purchased. Tha term of insurance will commence as af the data the inc2btedness is inc1.:rred and will ex~ire O:? ~:u 
d1t1 15 days after the original scheduled maturity data of the indebtedness. Subject ta acceptance by the insunnnd within 30 days, mere will b! :a!irn·?:: 
ta the insured debtor a certificate oi insuranc! more fully describing the insuranca. in the event of prepayment af the indebtedneu, a refund of in~unr.:1 
ctsar~es will be made when due. 
Applicant _________________ Witness --------------------D•t•---------------------
Co·Si9ner ___________________________ _ 
From the foregoing it is obvious that Hector 
Martinez was never requested to sign the certificate nor did 
he sign it, and as the Jury so found: Hector Martinez did 
not Know nor should he have known of the pre-existing physi-
cal condition exclusion referred to in the policy. 
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The premium was paid. No refund was ever made. 
(Tr.-163). The policy by its very terms gave the Insurance 
company the right to terminate the policy within thirty days 
if it concluded that Hector Martinez was not acceptable. 
The Company failed to act within the specified thirty day 
period--this is tantamount to the acceptance of Hector Mar-
tinez as an insured--under these circumstances the company 
cannot be permitted to void the policy eight months after 
the loss occurred. 
Good faith on all contracting parties is admitted. 
No deception was alleged or proven. The policy holder honest-
ly believed he was properly insured. Hector Martinez was 
not aware of any kidney failure (Tr.-43). He was induced 
to believe he was properly insured. To permit the insurance 
company to assert a voidable clause eight months after the 
loss occurred would be in defiance of the established law. 
The Great Equity Life.Insurance Company having 
plead an exception or exclusion as a defense, they had the 
burden of persuasion and the burden of proof to sustain their 
position. The Jury by a five to three vote found that they 
did not sustain their burden of proof and the Court ~hould 
have granted a mistrial in favor of Hector Martinez. 
-18-
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POINT III 
WHERE THERE IS ADMITTEDLY NO FRAUD AND THE INSURED IS LED 
TO BELIEVE THAT HE IS INSURED, THE COMPANY CANNOT DENY 
COVERAGE AFTER THE LOSS IS INCURRED. 
It was stipulated and agreed and conclusively 
shown that Rex Elton is a general agent of the Great Equity 
Life Insurance Company and as such he was given broad and 
general power (a) to accept risks, (b) bind insurer, (c) to 
fix an extra premium for hazardous risks, and (d) to collect 
premiums and issue policies. (See Phenix Insurance Company 
vs. Munger, 49 Kan. 178, 30 P. 120 (1892); Stephan vs. Mutual 
Benefit Health and Accident Association, 146 Kan. 307, 69 
P. 2d 694 (1937); Maynard vs. National Fire Insurance Company, 
147 W. _Va. 589, 129 S.E. 2d 443 (1963). 
In this regard Rex Elton, as a general agent was 
duty bound to make such inquiries and to ask the necessary 
questions to provide dector Martinez with proper insurance 
concerning his life and disability. It was the general 
agent's duty to ascertain whether or not Hector Martinez 
was insurable and to provide him with the proper policy. 
(~ee Wootton vs. Combined Insurance Company of America, 16 
Utah 2d 56). 
The Utah Supreme Court has specifically held that 
a general insurance agent is held to the standard of a 
-19-
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reasonable prudent insurance agent and as such he cannot 
"blind himself from ascertaining the truth and then provide 
the applicant with a policy of insurance which can unilat-
erally be declared void by reason of the agent's failure to 
ascertain from the applicant the status of his health"; he 
is required to investigate the health and condition of the 
applicant; he is required to determine whether or not the 
applicant is insurable under the policy; and, where the 
agent failed and refused to do so, under Utah law, it is 
presumed that he did .-so. (See, Couch on Insurance, Sect ion 
1~21. See also, New York Life Insurance Company vs. Strudel, 
· 5 Cir. 243, Fed. 2d 90; Wootton vs. Combined Insurance Com-
pany of America, 16 Utah 2d 52, 54-55, 395 P. 2d 724 (1964); 
Marks vs. Continental Casualty Company, 19 Utah 2d 119, 122, 
427 P. 2d 387 (1967). 
In Wootton vs. Combined Insurance Company of 
America, supra, our Supreme Court specifically held that 
an applicant for insurance is not required to volunteer 
information about his health and by reason of the agent's 
superior position that the general agent is required to as-
certain all facts that are needed to issue the policy. 
In this regard, the general agent of the Great 
Equity Life Insurance Company did lead Hector Martinez to 
. 
honestly believe that he was covered with a good and suffi-
cient life insurance policy and a disability insurance policy 
-20-
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and by reason thereof Hector Martinez has suffered great and 
serious damage in that he did not obtain other insurance and 
the insurance that was issued to him is now being unilater-
ally declared void. Had Rex Elton, the general agent of the 
insurance company, made known to Hector Martinez the contents 
of the insurance policy or had he delivered t6 Hector.Marti-
nez a copy of the policy, as was reguired, Hector Martinez 
would then have.been in a position to reject the policy and 
to obtain insurance elsewhere. 
It is undisputed that the Great Equity Life In-
surance Company accepted a good and sufficient premium; they 
led Hector Martinez to honestly believe he was fully an:d 
completely covered apd by doing so and by their failure to 
make the policy available to Hector Martinez or to inform 
him of th.e contents thereof, under Utah law there was deli-
berate, wilful conduct and statements on tbe part of the 
insurance company which caused Hector Martinez to reasonably 
believe. th.at he was insured and they thereby induced him to 
act in the belief th.at h.e was insured; and by their deli-
berate and wilful conduct--they are denied the right of now 
asserting that the policy they issued is voidable. 
It is the general law, and as such has been adopted 
by our Supreme Court, that where the insured has been mis-
led or imposed upon by an insurance company, the conditions 
wh.ich l:)rovide for a voidance of the policy and thereby violates 
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the dominant purpose of the insurance should be disregarded 
with princely liberality. The insurance company should be 
prevented from asserting the clause whenever necessary to 
prevent fraud or injustice from being per_petrated. (See 
Farm Bureau Mutual Automobile Insurance Company vs. Bobo, 
214 F. 2d. 575 (4th Cir. S.C. 1956); Travelers Fire Insur-
ance Company vs. Robertson, 103 Ga. Appellate 816, 120 S.E. 
2d 657 (1961); Mee vs. Bankers Life Association, 69 Minn. 
120, 72 N.W. 74 (1897); Bubuque Fire and Marine Insurance 
Company vs. Miller, 219 S.C. 17, 64 S.E. 2d 8 (1951). 
The insurance company by their deliberate, wilful 
conduct and statements caused Hector Martinez to ch~nge his 
position to his detriment. (See, Plan vs. Parkview Drugs, 
250 Southwest 2d, 181 Mo. Appellate 1952). The Court's 
attention is also called to Farrington ys. Granite State (Utah) 
Fire Insurance' 232 Pac' 754' in which our ··Supreme Court held 
that an insurance company cannot adopt and take the benefits 
of their general agent,. s conduct which is favorable to them 
and deny and not be bound by his conduct which is contra to 
their benefit. The insurance company is conclusively charged 
with his knowledge and his conduct. (See also, Turner vs. 
Mutual Benefit and Health Insurance, (24 Northwest 2d 534). 
The Court's attention is further called to Couch 
on Insurance, Section 10:7, which states the general law, 
that if the contract has been completed in good faith so 
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that the risk has been commenced the insurance is in effect 
as of the date that it was. to issue. (See, Couch on Insur-
ance, Section 10:7). Both parties contracted in good faith 
as of September 12, 1978. The risk commenced. Insurance 
was in effect as of that date. The insurance company's 
attempt to avoid the policy from the beginning should be 
denied in that the agent is charged with investigating the 
health of the applicant and it is presumeq that he did so. 
(See, Couch on Insurance, Section 11:21). 
Delivery is not necessary to place the insurance 
in effect. (See, Prince vs. Western Empire Insurance Com-
pany, 19 Utah 2d, 174, 428 P.2d 163; Ida Long vs. United 
Benefit Insurance Company, Incorporated, Supreme Court No. 
12844, filed March 8, 1973). In these cases, our Supreme 
Court held that.where an applicant has completed and sub-
mitted an application and paid a premium, and a receipt was 
issued wnich provides that the effective date of the insurance 
is the effective date of the application, a contract of in-
surance is created, and thereafter an insurance company 
cannot terminate the coverage by rejection after a loss has 
occurred. (See also, JoAnn B. Moore vs. Prudential Insurance 
Company of America, 26 Utah 2d 430). In the instant case, 
where the Great Equity Life Insurance Company has plead an 
exception or exclusion as a defense to the claim asserted by 
Hector Martinez, in which they claim a particular loss falls 
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within the exception to the coverage, the insurance company 
has a burden of persuasion and a burden of proof on this 
issue. ('See Rowland H, Long on the Law of Liability Insur-
ance, Section 26.21, paragraph 5, and the cases cited there-
under: Gusson vs. Boston Mutual Life Insurance Company, 
326 Mass. 571, 95 N.E. 2d 670). In this case the insurance 
company completely failed to sustain their burden of proof 
on the second question, and Judgment should be rendered in 
favor of Hector Martinez or in the alternative, the Court 
should grant a mistrial by reason of the Jury's 5 to 3 vote 
in favor of Hector Martinez. 
The Court's attentions is respectfully called to 
Long vs ... United Benefit Insurance Company, _Incorporated, 29 
Utah 2d 204, where our Supreme Court properly held that where 
an application is filled out by a general agent and the first 
payment premium is paid in full, the insurance becomes effec-
tive as of the date of the application. Temporary insurance 
coverage is g·iven for the time during which the application 
or approval of the application is pending. The Court will 
note that in the application blank (which was never signed 
and which was never given to Hector Martinez) it provided that 
the Great Equity Life Insurance Company had thirty (30) days 
to approve or disapprove the application for insurance. On 
Page 209, Long vs. United Benefit Insurance Company, Incor-
porated, supra, our Supreme Court went on to say that the 
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company was bound to either act affirmatively or negatively on 
the application. If the insured was an acceptable risk, he 
was entitled to the policy. if he was not acceptable, the 
insurance company was requried to so notify h.im and return the 
premium paid, or if rated up notify him by tendering him an 
ap~lication at a high rate. On the facts in the Long case, 
supra, the insured was never notified during his life that 
his application was accepted, rejected, or that it would be 
considered at a higher premium. Here the money for the first 
premium was retained by the insurance company until after the 
insured's death, when tender was made to the beneficiary for 
the return of the premium, which he rejected. In the instant 
case, Hector Martinez paid his premium. He was conclusively 
told that he was insured for disability insurance and at 
this point the Great Equity Life Insurance Company was under 
a duty to act either affirmatively or negatively on the appli-
cation. If Hector Martinez was not acceptable the insurance 
company was required to notify him and to return the premium 
paid, or if rated up, notify him by tendering an application 
at a higher rate. Th.is would have permitted Hector Martinez 
to purchase elsewhere and thereby be protected. The Company, 
by failing to act either affirmatively or negatively on the 
application denied Hector Martinez of this valuable right. 
As in the Long case, the insurance company did not deny 
coverage until after the loss had been incurred. 
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Under all cited cases and under our Utah laws, the 
Great Equity Life Insurance Company and its general agent 
are prevented from taking a legal position prejudicial to 
its insured to whom it induced by words or conduct t.o act 
to his detriment. Under this theory the Great Equity Life. 
Insurance Company is denied the right to assert the legal 
effect of a provision inserted in the policy for the benefit 
and protection of the insurance company. Hector Martinez 
was grievously misled and imposed upon by Rex Elton, the 
general agent, and by the Great Equity Life Insurance Company. 
Their conduct was tantamount to a fraud and a great injustice 
to Hector Martinez. The Jury so found the Great Equity Life 
Insurance Company fail~d to sustain their burden of proof 
that Hector Martinez knew or should have known of the pre-
existing physical condition exclusion and by reason thereof 
Judgment should be entered in favor of Hector Martinez and 
against the Great Equity Life Insurance Company or in the 
alternative, the Court should grant a mistrial on the grounds 
that the Jury was hung. 
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POINT IV . 
GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION AND STREATOR 
CHEVROLET ARE EQUALLY RESPONSIBLE BY REASON OF THE CONDI-
TIONAL SALES CONTRACT AND THE CERTIFICATE OF INSURANCE. 
Rex Elton was admittedly an agent, servant, and 
employee of Streator Chevrolet Company, Incorporated, and 
empowered· to fully complete and execute the Conditional 
Sales Contract and to complete the sale of the motor vehi-
cle involved in this suit. The Conditional Sales Contract 
was printed and provided by General Motors Acceptance Cor-
poration, in accordance with their instructions and require-
ments. Rex Elton was further empowered by General Motors 
Acceptance Corporation and Streator Chevrolet Company, In-
corporated to write insurance-for and on behalf of the 
Great Equity Life Insurance Company under a group insurance 
policy which the group premiums were paid by Streator Chev-
rolet Company, Incorporated and under which General Motors 
Acceptance Corporation was a creditor-beneficiary. Irres-
pective of the foregoing Judge Conder, by his rulings re-
fused to permit defendant, Hector Martinezts, attorney to 
show that Rex Elton was biased and prejudiced, in that he 
received a commission from the sale of the policy and that 
he was acting in·dual capacities. (Tr.-159) 
Rex Elton testified that at all times he was acting 
as an agent, servant, and employee of Streator Chevrolet 
-27-
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Company, Incorporated and that he well knew that Streator 
Chevrolet Company, Incorporated was the policy holder and 
that General Motors Acceptance Corporation was the benefi-
riiary under the policy. The Court refused inquiry as to who 
paid him his commission and the ~ount thereof. This is 
assigned as error. (See also, Group Policy, defendant's 
Exhibit 16). 
The Conditional Sales Contract was negotiated 
forthwith from St~eator Chevrolet Company, Incorporated, to 
General Motors Acceptance Corporation. Car payments were made 
by Hector Martinez to Streator Chevrolet Company, Incorporated 
for and on. behalf of General Motors Acceptance Corporation. 
After Hector Martinez suffered his disability, an insurance 
premium and/or car payment of $40.00 was paid directly to 
General Motors Acceptance Corporation, the creditor-beneficiary 
under the policy. General Motors Acceptance Corporation saw 
fit to interpret the policy and to notify Hector Martinez 
that he was not covered under the group policy on or about 
July 12, 1979. (At least a letter to that effect was intro-
duced into evidence). lTr. Wl , P--JI) 
Wh.en General Motors Acceptance Corporation accepted 
the Conditional Sales Contract in its entirety and the in-
surance policy under which they were the creditor-beneficiary 
they became bound by all the terms of the contract and by 
all th.e terms· and conditions of the group insurance policy 
..-28..-
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and the certificate of insurance. They were necessary 
parties to the entire transactions and became equally 
responsible to Hector Martinez under the terms and condi-
tions thereof. 
POINT V 
THE GENERAL AGENT,. REX ELTON, WAS REQUIRED TO INQUIRE AS 
TO THE APPLICANT'S HEALTH AND TO ADVISE HIM OF THE VOIDABLE 
CLAUSES IN THE POLICY. 
Rex Elton testified he had no memory of the exe-
cution of the Conditional Sales contract or the issuance 
of Insurance. He denied all knowledge of the $5000.00 trans-
action. He had no memory of ever dealing with Hector Mar-
tinez (Tr.-150) (Tr.-151). This is very hard to comprehend 
in that Hector Martinez and Manual M. Rivera were son and 
father; several documents were prepared by Elton and execu-
ted. It is submitted that this was a convenient loss of 
memory, in order to base a case on custom and usage. Custom 
and usage should not stand against positive evidence testi-
fied to by the father and son, both of them were present and 
testified, no policy was delivered or explained. The insurance 
company's case was based solely on a no memory premise--
this should be reversed. 
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POINT VI 
THE GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION IS NOT ENTITLED 
TO ANY ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
At the· conclusion of the General Motors Accep-
tance Corporation's case, Jay V. Barney requested the Court 
to take under advisement, the issue of attorney's fees and 
argued that the issue of attorney's fees was to be deter-
mined by the Court and not the Jury. This Motion was made 
at the bench with the Jury sitting in place. Mark S. Miner 
advised Jay V. Barney in the presence of the Court (out of 
the hearing distance of the Jury) that the issue of attor-
ney's fees for breach of the contract was an issue for the 
Jury and that if Mr. Barney desired to seek attorney's fees 
he should proceed with his evidence in the presence of the 
Jury and permit the Jury to decide the issue, Mr. Barney 
refused to present any evidence with regard to attorney's 
fees. The record is devoid of any evidence of attorney's 
fees, The matter was never presented to the Jury. By not 
presenting the evidence to the Jury and/or to the Court, 
the General Motors Acceptance Corporation waived their right 
to attorney,. s fees and none should be award~d. (See Peterson 
vs. Ohio Copper Company, 71 Utah. 444, 266 P. 2d 1050). 
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CONCLUSION 
Hector Martinez purchased disability insurance 
in good faith. The Great Equity Life Insurance Company 
granted the insurance subject to their acceptance of Hector 
Martinez as an insured and agreed that within thirty (30) 
days there would be delivered to Hector Martinez, a certi-
ficate of insurance. No policy was ever delivered. There 
was no acceptance or rejection within the thirty-day period. 
No premium was ever returned. The Jury, by a five to three 
vote, found in favor of Hector Martinez and against the 
Great Equity Life Insurance Company, that Hector Martinez 
did not know of any pre-existing physical condition exist-
ing in the policy. The· policy was issued in good faith; 
Hector Martinez relied upon the policy. Under these circum-
stances the insurance company should not be permitted to 
void the policy eight months after the loss occurred. The 
insurance company failed to sustain their burden of proof 
and judgment should be rendered against them and the policy 
enforced or in the alternative a new trial should be granted 
by reason of the hung jury. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Hector Martinez 
M. Rivera 
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I hereby certify I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Brief of Appellants, Hector Martinez and 
Manuel M. Rivera to: 
Jay V .. Barney, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
General Motors Acceptance Corporation 
45 East Vine Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
William J. Hansen, Esq. 
Attorney for Third-Party Defendants 
Great Equity Life Insurance Company 
900 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
and that said Brief was duly served according to law on 
this c1.~ day of ~ , 19 /'/, postage 
prepaid. 
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~~hd- P-1 
__.., 
_ 1. ---· -~LcoNTRAd I 1BER . . - j NUMBER-·r~ _____ _._ 
.. ... ,._\. •"'" 
r- ...... 
.. ~ ·" 
. . . 
Address 
__..._._-· ,.· 'rnvi1 s0 ely for the disclosure purposes of the Consumer Credit Protecticri Act. 
---
\\J.··, ' · /\\( 
~~Rd Co-Buyer~Name and Address (lncl_ude-County and Zip Code) Seller-!'fa:::a and Address 
\ \ ~ ' . . :, ' : . . \ .,... - . '. . ..: '. . . . ~ ~ ~ ·. , . . · \ . . ' . ... ... " . 
; I ; 
STRJ:Al'OJ. CBEVltOLET CO-dPANY 
HAD.I at · Sth SOOTH 
SALT LAn CITY, UTAH 84111 
It seller hereby sells, and the buyer (meaning all undersigned buyers, jointly and severally) hereby purc~ases, subject to the terms set forth below and upon the reverse side bererl, 
II following property, delivery and acceptance of which in good order are hereby acknowledged by buyer, viz.: 
1trorU11d Year Model No. Cyl. Make Trade Name Body Type - If Truck,_ Give GVW Model No. or Serles Vehicle Identi fication No. 
... 
·• 
I i 
•. 
\ 
'. ~ \ J 
' ·. 
' 
·. \ \ i . ' . 
tt lrllck-Describe bodies and, major items of equipment sold-
' 
., 
·.,.,represents that th~ purchase of said property is primarily for personal, family or house ho~~· agricultural D. business (other than agricultural) 0 use (check one). 
; L CASH PRICE (including any accessories, servJces and taxes imposed on the cash sale) •· .. . .. \ ..... . ............... ; ....................... . $ 4500.00 (1) 
It TOTALDOWNPAYMENT-Trade·in ~/f,{""'.1/i . ..\ $ ·n.11. $ '·!IX.a. $ " · "· plus$ ]nno.oo $ 1000.00 (2) I ;_ I Make, Model. Year Gron Trad•·in '• (Payoff· made by Trade· in (Itel) C..sh Oownpayment 
· · Allowance seller) 
1 UNPAID BALANCE OF CASH PRICE (Difference between Items 1 and 2) . .............................. . ...... . ............. . ......... . . $ 3500.00 (3) 
t OTHER CHARGES 
•A. Cost of Required Physical Damage l11surance . ..........•... . .... . ......... . ..•.. . ... . . . .. . ... •.... . . . ...... . .. -~ .. •.. . .. .. · · · · · · · · · $ 1'a a. (4Al 
**S. Cost of Optional Mechanical Breakdown Insurance .... .. ... ..... ........ .. .................................... . ... .. ........ · .. · .. · .. $ u.a. !4B) 
BUYER MAY CHOOSE THE PERSON THROUGH WHICH THE INSURANCE IN A AND B IS TO BE OBTAINED. 
C. Cost of Creditor Insurance for the term hereat. 
COVERAGE Of THE BUYER BY AHY SUCH INSURANCE IS NOT REQUIRED BY SELLER. 
CHECK CIEDITDI *** rJ:] Life .... . .......... · . .... . ........ . ... .. .. .. ... .. . . ......... . ....... . .. . ........ $ 
INSUUNCE DESIRED l!l Disability (Accident and Health). . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . • $ 
FOi TF..E MM 1!El.E0'1 O Other (describe) .......... . ...... . . .'. .... .. . ... .. ................ . ........... . .. $ 
IUYER'S APPROVAL: I ols1RE TO OBTAIN THE CREDITOR INSURANCE CHECKED ABOVE FOR THE BUYER PROPOSED FOR INSURANCE. 
. , . . . .. - ~ . ... ... -· 
Sl111t1ra/. I -~ Y', · f·rl 1 • G , --~ / .._ -:' .c_......t. ' ""v .... I/,,· .,-\ .-\ l , \. ~-.. ~--------------7=) 
(Buyer's Slcnaturtf \ • ~ - ; __ (Co-Buyer's Si1n1ture) 
.. . r~ .. 
g/] ?/78 
(Date) 
97.£0 !4Cl 
lS9.S1 !4Cl 
1'!I •I!• !4Cl 
D. OfficialFees(Describe) ••..•••... •••..••••..•• SALES . .?AX ........ . ... ............ ....................... ..... ............ .. $ '?15.00 !401 
E. License and/or Registration Fees (Itemize)........... . ...... . . . ............... . .. . .... . . . ... . ................................ . .... $ S. 50 (4El 
F. Certificate.of Title Fee ••.••••..•. ••••••••••••••••••••....••••••• ~.' .............................................................. S---n.cl..-(4f) 
G. Other(Oe~cribe) ... . ........................ l)OC •.. ?.tt .... .......... ......... .......................................... : .. $ 7.~0 (4GJ 
i. UNPAID BALA~CE-AMOUNT FINANCED (Sum of items 3 and 4) .••.•...• •.•..•• •..••• •.•• •••••. ••.•• ••.••...••...•.. •. . .•........• • •. \$ lt023 a2l (5) 
l Fl:!ANCE C~ARGE .................. : ............ ... .............. ....... .. .............. ............................ ........... S. 956.7-9--:6) 
1. TOTALOFPAYMENTS(Sumofitems.Sand6) ............ . ...... . ...... . .. . ....... -r-··········· · ··········· ·· · ···· · ············· ·· · · $. 4995.':'0 -.(7) 
l D~ERRED PAYMENT PRICE (Sum of items 1, 4 and 6) ...... . .................... . .. . ................. . ........................ .. ..... $ 5935 .ca :.8) 
t ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATE . .. . ... .. ........ .... .... ........ .•.. .. .. .. .. ................ ... ........... .. .. .. .... . .. .. ..... 14. 55 3 (9) 
I~ PAYMENT SCHEDULE: The Total o( Payments (Item 7) is payable at seller's office designated below or at such office of any assignee as may be hereafter designated in-3.L 
instalments of$ l 18 • 75 each, commencing l.Qfl2= , 19!8__. and on the same day of each successive month thereafter, or as indicated 
in space below. 
;_\ ; ~( \ .'. 
.. . ' . 
' .i '• 
' . \ 
• ' l \ 
I Any instalment which is more than· twice the amount of an otherwise reg~larly sche_duled equal instalment is a BALLOON PAYMENT. Unless the prope~y described in this contract is (_ 
to be used primarily for agricultural or leasing purposes. buyer has the right to refinance the amount of any Balloon Payment at the time 1t 1s due without penalty and under terms 
which shall be no less favorable to the buyer than the terms of the original sale. These provisions do not apply to the extent that the Payment Schedule is adjusted to the seasonal l 
or irregular-income of the buyer. 
IL DEFAULT CHARGE IN EVENT OF LATE PAYMENT If any instalment is not paid within 10 days after it is due, buyer agrees to pay a delinquency charge equal ta 53 of the unpaid instalment 
not to exceed $9 if property hereunder is purchased primarily for personal, family, household or agricultural use. l 
l2. OfSCRIPTION OF SECURITY INTEREST Seller reta1n_s a security_ 1_nteresi und er the U;;1!orm Comrnerc:a! Code ' !'! the property r1mnbed above and any proceeds to secure payment and 
perlormanc& of buyer's obligation hereunder. including any add1t1onal indebtedness incurred as provided herein. and under any extensions or renewals hereof. 
13. PREPAYMENT REBATE Upon prepayment in full buyer is entitled to a rebate of the Finaj}Ce Charge (Item 6) computed in accordance with the Rule of 78 if the obligation hereunder is 
oricinally payable in 61 instalments or less; otherwise in accordance with the actuarial method. A minimum charge will be ret.ained in_ determining the amount of the rebate as fol-
lows: $5 if the Amount Financed does not exceed $75; $7.50 when the Amount Financed exceeds $75. No rebate under $1 will be paid. 
*Required Physical Damage Insurance ~\ ·1_ . . • /- •--Optional Mechanical Breakdown Insurance 
Insurance Company ~?\,:,'~ 0 • ~ Term· __ months Insurance Compao/'\,1 }= 
O $ ___ Deductib~e ~llision-and also select one of the lall~wing: ~v& {h .l~ 
0 Full Comprehensive mcluding-Fir~·Theft and Com limed Additional Coverage Term: O 36 months . or 36.000 mi(es. whichever occurs first 
0 $ ___ Deductible Comprehensive including-Fire·Theft and Combined Additional Coverage Term: O ( 
0 Fire-Theft and Combined, Additional Coverage · . O $25 Deductible O $50 O~ductible O $ __ Oeducti~le 
·1 Optional if desired-Towing and labor'. costs O Rental Reimbursement O ·· .... · ... 
The insurance, if any, referred to in this contract does not include coverage for bodily injury and property damage caused to others. 
Amrdln1 lo I er ms and conditions nt lorlh I• policy or e1rtlftca11 of las11nac1 lss11d by lh1 l1sam as cbeck1d below 11d 11 "Notice DI Prapaud Creditor lnsaranca DI Lll1 
of_Bayer" coatalned Oil reum of bayar's copy of contnct. 
Bayer Propou~. For Uft lnsmru: The pmoa whosa um1 a;i,em on llne A below (co-boyer, If any. on 11111 B, when buyer Is a corporation °' partntrshlp). 
0 The Pradentbl IDS11ranca CampaaJ of America, Newm, New Jmey, 1mder Its Group PalicJ Ha. GL·l&a. The lnsurantt andtr said 
fl'.OUP JOllcJ does not mer (I) tilt ~ayer Prnpasad for lift lns11n11C1 ff age &5 or man on the date of this contract or (10 suicide 
withla one Jll3r lhmfrom. Uadar said UoUJI poficy, the maximum amount ol lns11nnct1 for this contract Is SlD,000 and the mu.Imam 
auretale amoaat a1 lnsunnce lor this and 2111 other lnsf~ment c011trxt at the buyer Is S15,000. · 
BUYER'S AGE STATEMENT AND HEALTH DECLARATION (AppOcabfa When 1 Cbzrie HIS Beta Aathorfnd In 4C Abon md 
lnsmnca Under Prvtlentlll Groap P1Jlty GL·l&O Is Prapasacf). . ..J.... _ . . 
Ap last birthday of Bayer ~d fllr Ure lasunncar 0 Uadn &5 . ., . . . ~ · .. . 
I, rhe Buyer Proposed for Ufe IDSl!Ti?:a, aadentand lh;t thf l11Sm111C1 Is caly mibblt to a ~yer who makas th1 lollawln1 llKlanllons 
to ladaai Pradenffal ID etrcct mth lnsmnte: I do hmbJ ded .. that within ll:t µst Ihm months (1) I han nat cunsulfed or been under 
the e2r1 ot a doctor ar other przti!imr far canm, and (l) I hn1 not baa canfined In a hOSjlftal or other lastiflltf.m 1!9eause of any 
condition Df the hurt. bnin, Jim, kldnen or l111ii. I hereby nthartza 111y Jhyskiu or hospilJI ro lllsclm II Pnldaolial ~ llformaUoa 
coacmin& my melf'ial history prior to Iha data of lhls cntracL 
Sl1nalun 
Plf'""~-~--.,,,..._~__,.-=--__,,--__,_,._..,..,.,.....,_~~--------( Si 1n1 lure of Buyer Proposed for Ute Insurance) 
Under pollCJ Of aban deslpa!ed Insurer, mulmum amoun 
Of lnsuranct ander this contnct Is $49-9-S....O.O-~. 
md mulmum aurecat1 amount af lnsannct andtt tbls an. 
any other lnstJlmeat contract of lht buyer Is S l!> 000 
NOTICE 
ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT IS SUBJECT TO All CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH THE DEBTOR COULD ASSERT AGAINST TH: 
SELLER OF GOODS OR SERVICES OBTAINED PURSUANT HERETO OR WITH THE PROCEEDS HEREOF. RECOVERY HEREUNDER BY THE DEBTOR SHAU 
NOT EXCEED AMOUNTS PAID BY THE DEBTOR HEREUNDER. . 
Executed in quintuplicate, copy of which was delivered to, and receipt is acknowledged by, buyer, this,-....12,,..__day of __ **9 ___ _,, 11.8-
" ... Buyer \ __,.,.. -~ .~ :.,.;.-... 
~s In In~ ....;._· - .· • . ·.r-. ·~ 
Seller ·;. · 
Slcns In Ink 
,,,,. snu.:A.nm CE?'!mOtiT COUP uiY 
--The foregoing contract is hereby assigned under the terms of the "Seller's Recom· 
mendation, Assignment and Guaranty (With Recourse)" on th~. erse . .s1~·de. 
/-~~// 
/ .'' // ;~.L , / ·_1 ....... . 
Seller By (II Corp. or Partnership) (Title) 
The foregoing contract is hereby assigned under the terms or the "Seller's Recommenda· 
tion and Assignment (Without Recourse or With Umited Recourse)" on the reverse side. 
Seller By (II Corp. or Partnership) (Title) 
I 
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J. GREAT EQUITY LIFE INSl.i'lL\NCE CQ\IP.~1'Y 
CHICAGO ILLINOIS 
1 NOTICE OF PROPOSED CREDIT 
. 
· · (herein called •"the Compeny .. ) I CERTIFICATE NUMBER A536914 i LIFE & DISA3:~,TY INSURANCE 
'1NSUR§Jl-D'5~~re1n caI19d"-Y au'•) 
-· 
' 
AGE CREDITOR GROUP POL.ICY NO. 
I (Hector M. M.:lrtinex 19 
,GMAC P.O. BOX 25873 :nRE'• • ".c1uss -- 8416 1. Sal~ Lake City ,Utha ~4125 8101 South 2200 ~·Test 
-:CITY STATE ZIP COOE DATE OF INDEBTEDNESS' TERM OF 
West Jordan. Utah 84084 ·- INSURANCE MONTH OAY YEAR (MONTHS) 
JCO·SIGNER \LIFE INSURANCE ONL. Y) ! 
t 
AGE 
n.a. 9 12 78 36 
- . ,;a£.ONO BENEFICIARY STREET AOORESS CITY STATE ZIP CODE 
Estate 
LIFE INSURANCE TOTAL DISABILITY INSURANCE 
COVERAGE CHARGE INITIA!. ~tfARG£ MOPHHLY WAITING PERIOD (ELECT ONE) AMOUNT BENEFIT 
·:mGLE LIFE Cl $ 97 .40 s 4995.00 s 189 .81 $138.75 BENEFITS ARE PAYABLE AFTER 14 JCINT LIFE 0 DAYS.COMMENCING WITH THE 1st DAY. 
1Maximum age: cannot exceed age 69 MAXIMUM AMOUNT OF INSURANCE MAXIMUM MONTHLY BENEFIT 
ia; the scheduled maturity data of llFE INSURANCE I DISABILITY INSURANCE (TOTAL DISABILITY) .indebtedness. S1s,ooo $15,000 $400.00 
IL.IENHOLCER (if dlffer-ent from Creditorl 
I MAXIMUM TERM FOR DISABILITY INSURANCE 
48 MONTHS 
The Signer(s) of the contract hereby take(s) notice that group credit life insurance coverage and/or group credit accident and health insurance coverage will 
be applicable to this contract if so marked on the front of the contract and each such type_ of coverage will be written by the insurance company named 
above. This insurance, subject to acceptance by the insurer covers only the person(s) signing the request for such insurance. The amount of charge is indicated 
for each type of credit insurance to be purchased. The term of insurance will commence as of the date the indebtedness is incurred and will expire on the 
date 15 days after the original scheduled. maturity date of the indebtedness. Subject to acceptance by the insurer and within 30 days, there will be delivered 
to the insured debtor a certificate of insurance more fully describing the insurance. In the event of prepayment of the indebtedness, a refund of insurance 
charges will be made where due. 
Applicant _____________ Witness --------------D•t•--------------
Co·Signer ____________________ _ 
LIMITATION OF COVERAGES 
• EFFECTIVE DATE: The effective date of coverage is tha date you becomi obligated to the Creditor (shown above as the "Date of Indebtedness"). 
, ;.tAXIMUM AGE: No person is eligible for this insurance if on or before the scheduled maturity data of indebtedness, such person will have passed the age of 
SS, unless such indebtedness results from the renewal or refinancing of all indebtedness for which such person was previously insured by the above group 
:ciicy. 
PERSONS INSURED: If single life insurance is elected, only you are insured in the event of death. If joint life insurance is elected. both you and your 
! =a-signer are insured in the event of death. Joint life insurance will pay only one death benefit. If a death benefit is paid, as a result of your death or the death 
of your co-signer, no insurance will thereafter be in effect under this cenificate. If your death and your co-signer's death occur simultaneously, one death 
oenefit will be paid for your death only. 
Ii disability insurance is elected. only you are insured in tha event of total disability and ·only if you are gainfully employed for compensation for at least 
tn1rty hours per week on the effective date of coverage. 
1 No person is eligible for any insurance hereunder if such person is a corporation, association or pannership. 
• EXCLUSIONS: NO INSURANCE IS PROVIDED HEREUNDER: IF DEATH RESULTS FROM SUICIDE, WHETHER SANE OR INSANE, WITHIN ONE 
YEAR FOLLOWING THE DATE OF INDEBTEDNESS. IF DISABILITY RESULTS FROM (a) NORMAL PREGNANCY; (b) INTENTIONALLY SELF· 
INFLICTED INJURY WHILE SANE OR INSANE; (c) FLIGHT IN A NON-SCHEDULED AIRCRAFT; (d) WAR OR MILITARY SERVICE; (e) INJURY 
SUSTAINED OR SICKNESS CONTRACTED FOR WHICH MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS OR TREATMENT WAS REQUIRED, OR WOULD HAVE CAUSED A 
REASONABLY PRUDENT PERSON TO HAVE SOUGHT MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS OR TREATMENT WITHIN SIX MONTHS PRIOR TO THE EFFECTIVE 
DATE OF THIS CERTIFICATE ANO WHICH CAUSES A LOSS WITHIN SIX MONTHS AFTER SUCH EFFECTIVE DATE OF COVERAGE; PROVIDED, 
I HOWEVER, THAT DISABILITY COMMENCING ·AFTER SIX MONTHS FROM THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF COVERAGE RESULTING FROM SUCH 
' CONDITION SHALL BE COVERED. 
~ ~ARTIAL LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE: ff the initial indebtedness exceeds.the maximum amount of life insurance permitted for an indebtedness on the 
, ~ate. of the loan, the amount of indebtedness covered by the fife insurance throughout the term of the loan shall be the ratio of the maxim.um amount of 
; ufe insurance shown above to the initial indebtedness and such ratio shall be established on the date of the indebtedness. 
• OlSABILITY ~NS URAN CE LIMITS: The amount of Monthly Disability Benefit set fonh in the schedule may b~ I~ _than the ~~nthly installment payments 
· necessary to discharge the unpaid indebtedness. In no event will the Company issue an amount of Monthly 01sab1hty Benefit in excess of t~e lesser of (a) 
: maximum monthly benefit set fonh in the schedule, (b) the initial indebtedness. d~~ed by the number of monthly payQ and (c) an.._\\ount which 
' would result In aggregate monthly disability payments of $15,000. ~~ _ ~ \ ~ \(]) 
JON-T ~ ,'('{"'. V..o..~ )_ ~'1\~~~\nl'OIV\ 
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